Print this Article

By: Baiq Wardhani & Vinsensio Dugis

East Asia regionalization has steadily grown since two decades ago. However, regionalism involving ASEAN and North Asian countries has just come into effect in the late of 1990s. The paper briefly discusses some developments in the ASEAN+3 forum and argues that it has substantially strengthened the cohesiveness of East Asia in many fields but its future directions will be shaped by its ability to face some potential dilemmas.

Formation of ASEAN+3

To a large extent, the formation of forum or cooperation mechanism such as ASEAN+3 has its roots way back to the period just after World War II. Conventionally, particular conditions with specific characteristics in a given period of time lead to the formation of such cooperation (Hunt, 2003). Stubbs (2002: 441) argues that the ASEAN+3 has simply been ‘the latest manifestation of the evolutionary development of East Asian regional cooperation’. However, prominent reasons for the formation of the ASEAN+3 are as follow.

First, the expanding regionalism in Europe and North America has become a push factor for the growth of East Asian regionalism (He, 2004: 105). The continued expansion of regionalism involving European and North American countries in the 1980s has partly increased awareness within the North East Asian countries (China, Japan, and South Korea) that the development could hamper their emerging economy. In its development process, the 1996 ASEM meeting and the 1997 Kuala Lumpur ASEAN Summit were stepping stones for the development of a larger East Asian regionalism. Coupled with the failure of APEC to materialize the expected regionalism in the Asia Pacific region, the need for the more realistic, Asian-based multilateralism is a necessity. The formation of ASEAN+3 met this development.

Second, the 1997 Asian economic crisis was a lesson learned that had accelerated the importance for the need of a collective action from East Asian countries to economic and financial terms. The severe impact of the crisis gave an impetus for enhancing their cooperation to anticipate the potential economic and financial difficulties in the future. The notion strengthened given the fact that APEC and other financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank did not provide significant assistance to the affected countries. Indeed a negative sentiment emerged arguing that instead of solving the problems, the IMF’s policy recommendations led to more intricate problems (Prasetyono, 2007:2). Joined by what seemed to be a low solidarity from extra regional countries toward the affected countries in Asia, accelerated a belief about an urgent need for a kind of cooperation that could meet the future effect of economic crisis.

Third, the fast growing of East Asian economic power, especially China, has been a positive sign for sustainability of a stronger regional power that may lead to the whole regional stability. It is a fact equally that Japan and South Korea are also economically strong and developed compared to at least other countries in Asia outside China. The three countries have long believed that they could become important players in East Asia regionalism provided they are able to arrange an economic concert of three powers.

Four, due to the Association’s relatively success to manage intra-states conflicting interest, ASEAN has been seen as the vehicle to bridge the uneasy relationship between East Asian countries. ASEAN is regarded as a unifying factor, in which crucial for the betterment of interaction of East Asian nations. The problem to realize their desire, however, is the well-known political problems they have inherited from the Second World War. This led to the question of the way through which they could bring the notion into reality. It is within this context that ASEAN is a potential partner that could bridge them to materialize the desire.

The formation of ASEAN+3 has been a result of a ‘natural’ process, the ultimate manifestation and the evolution of an East Asian regionalism (Sulistyo et al., 2002: 29). In essence, the conditions mentioned above led to the formation of East Asia grouping. With the support of some ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia which have voiced similar idea in the early 1990’s, the idea went further and it culminated in a meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1997 attended by ASEAN countries and three of its East Asia partners (China, Japan, South Korea); the ASEAN+3 was formally established.

The momentum for cooperation involving the ASEAN+3 members grew even stronger following the initiative of South Korea proposing the establishment of East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) in 1998. Comprising of mainly prominent non-government figures, the 2001 report of EAVG suggested that the people of East Asia intended to “create an East Asian Community of peace, prosperity and progress based on the full development of all peoples in the region”. It was the EAVG recommendations that were further examined by the East Asian Study Group (EASG), a study group that chiefly comprised of government officials. The essence of both groups’ work was the formation of cooperation involving members of ASEAN+3 with the main objective mentioned above.

Achievements so Far

As the EASG recommendations were the base of work of ASEAN+3 at the institutional level, it is necessary to examine its achievements on those recommendations. ASEAN+3 forum is a case of point where East Asia cooperation finds its prospective arrangement. For example, during the first year of its formation in 1997-1998 economic interdependence and complementarity in areas of trade, investments and technological transfers took place among members, in which this demonstrated an ongoing process of regional integration among them. Within this circumstance, ASEAN+3 provides an institutional framework into it (Alatas 2001: 2).

Thanks to the absence of credible economic institutions to deal with Asian financial crisis, the ASEAN+3 contributed significant achievements in the area of financial and monetary cooperation. The Chiang Mai meeting in 2000 has agreed to pool hard currency resources as one of mechanism to increase regional cooperation (Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002: 2). The meeting presented a stronger voice of East Asian states, which increase its global negotiation and bargaining positions vis a vis the emergence of large trading blocs in Europe and North America.

A more vigorous institutionalization of the ASEAN+3 has increased since the Kuala Lumpur Summit and it took place in a larger bureaucratic, academics and cultural levels. For example, since 2001 ASEAN+3 organized meetings between groups including e-ASEAN+3 Working Group, APT Young Leaders, and the APT Labour Ministers. Additionally the EAVG, which consists of eminent persons, undertook a 1999 study of East Asia Economic Cooperation System planned to foster future cooperation and integration in East Asia region (Department of the Parliamentary Library 2002: 1).

The ASEAN+3 has been growing as a mature regional ‘economic’ organization that complements to East Asian regionalization including ASEAN (as a ‘political’ arrangement), SEANWFZ, ASC and ARF (as ’security’ deals), APEC and EAS (as ‘multitask’ organizations) and AFTA (a forthcoming trade liberalization). ASEAN+3 has so far committed to its position not to embrace outside powers such as the US and Australia who has consistently challenged the existence of this regionalism. Furthermore, politically, ASEAN+3 has proved to be a solid regionalization by its ability to become a confidence-building measure instrument, considering the awkward relationship among some of its members. Although ASEAN+3 is decidedly to work in economic realm, this forum is a vital part of the network. The relative peace of the East Asian region has flourished development and cooperation among ASEAN+3 members that bring the desire to perpetuate prosperity comes into existent.

In terms of cooperation, there are six-grouped fields of area formulated in 26 recommendations (17 short-term and 9 mid long-term), which put economic cooperation as the first priority. Although not all 17 short-term recommendations have been undertaken, a number of activities have been commenced and a number of mechanisms have been established to intensify the interaction. However, there have been different achievements from one sector to another. The overall, the entire recommendations of EASG have strengthened the institutionalization of ASEAN+3 (Keliat, 2007: 2-4).

Among ASEAN, Malaysia has been the most active member of any ASEAN+3 activities, a deed consistent to the country’s ambitions to establish an East Asian regionalism. Due to more economically advanced countries, China, Japan and South Korea have been so far taken more active role in implementing the EASG recommendations. For instance, till the year 2006 China has applied 12 activities, meanwhile Japan 11 and South Korea 8 activities.

In sum, the activities taken place since its establishment has been considerably vital in contributing peace, stability and prosperity in the region. This is certainly has to be sustained.

Looking Into the Future

Having shortly examined the achievements of ASEAN+3, its future very much depends on how it deals with some challenging circumstances, of which we thought that the following four issues are prominent.

[a]. Regarding its institutionalism, to make the forum works effectively, it needs to observe a scenario: the ASEAN+3 does not need new membership in the near future.

This scenario is based on the assumption that the additional member of the forum may slow down its cooperation. ASEAN+3 maybe trapped in an ineffective ‘APEC-style’ organization. Similarly, the establishment of East Asia Summit (EAS) may pose a new kind of ‘threat’ for ASEAN+3 because this forum may dominate, particularly by the ‘potentially odd’ members that have had long ambitions to dominate the Forum. The focus of the cooperation should aim to improve economic, social and technical cooperation. However, the Forum shall observe to an “open regionalism” as a sensible choice of membership in the future (Alatas, 2001: 2).

[b]. ASEAN+3 or any Asian regionalism lies under the shadow of the US superior power.

In trade relations, the states of East Asia are reluctant to exclude important trading partners such as the US from regional organizations. Culturally, typical East Asia regionalization tends to adopt the doctrine of defending traditional culture and resisting the penetration of Western culture. Politically, although rejected by some East Asian states, the US remains to be seen as a decisive and influential player in the region. However, the discourse on Asian regionalism framed in terms of the opposition between East and West is “doomed to failure” in practice (He, 2004: 112). Similarly, Beeson suggests that the idea of East Asian regionalism has been at the same time “driven and constrained [emphasis added] by a complex array of contingent internal factors and powerful external influences in surprising and unpredictable ways” (Beeson, 2003: 2).

[c]. Beside directed exclusively with economic and financial issues, ASEAN+3 should equip itself with more foreseeable mechanism to deal with new non-traditional emerging issues that affect human security such as terrorism, cross-border political crisis (such as the East Timor case), Avian influenza, trans-boundary environment catastrophe (such as haze problem), human and drug trafficking, money laundering, cyber crime, HIV/AIDS, in which all, if not carefully managed, may disrupt the economic and financial cooperation, interrupt peace and stability among the Forum’s members.

[d]. The development of East Asian regionalism is hampered by some concerns upon the sovereignty doctrine and the centrality of the nation-states.

Most East Asian countries support regionalism for national interest and state power. Regionalism is an application instrument to national building and nationalism is always of the essence. It means that Asian nation-states would not give up their sovereignty for a regional order; development of East Asian regionalism “did not begin with reducing sovereignty but with supporting it” (He, 2004:120). East Asian sensitiveness to national sovereignty, compared with EU, East Asian nations are not ready to give up some of their sovereign qualities (i.e. non-intervention was and still the principle firmly held by ASEAN) to a larger inter-state arrangements. After all, sovereignty principle constitutes a basis for regional order.

[e]. The US’s war in terrorism has relatively declined the status of the US in the global system. Although there has not been a certainty for the future of world order in the post-transformed US hegemony, there is a good deal of opportunity for the ASEAN+3 to become a more independent regionalism with less outside intervention.

The ASEAN+3 needs to demonstrate its willingness to achieve tangible progress by carrying out a number of concrete projects and programs have been planned so far. In the same vein, the forum should take an assertive role in initiating bold steps to materialize its desire and intended goals including a more cohesive formation of an East Asian economic integration, Asian Monetary Fund, East Asia Free Trade Area, and East Asia Investment Information Network.